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On December 27, 2004, I was a helicopter pilot stationed on board the U.S.S ABRAHAM LINCOLN. The carrier battle group had jU.S.t pulled out of Hong Kong for a port visit and we were supposed to be heading north in order to patrol the waters off the Korean shores. Instead, we were heading south. Then Rear Admiral Douglas Crowder, the Battle Group Commander, made the decision to head toward the area where a tsunami had struck just the day before. I had heard vague descriptions of the disaster, but just days later, we were in position to help the stricken survivors. Over the course of the next month, I delivered over 100,000 pounds of food, water, and medical supplies, provided valuable reconnaissance information from my position in the air, and rescued 93
survivors from their plight. It was the most rewarding mission of my life and helped sway my decision to stay in the Navy years later.
In 2012, I had a discussion about HA/DR with a colleague who is a Surface Warfare Officer, who had quite a different experience on board a guided missile destroyer the Navy sent in response to the earthquake in Pakistan. The Navy had diverted his ship approximately 1200 miles in order to respond to the crisis and when the ship arrived, it was only able to offer minimal support. While they could act as a refueling station for helicopters operating in the area, the ship could not provide any direct support to the devastated area as they did not have a helicopter stationed onboard. My friend was extremely frustrated as they had been performing an important mission before responding to the earthquake and believed that his ship was actually a hindrance to the relief effort because his ship was clogging the area without being able to provide support.
Ever since I had that conversation with my friend, I had always felt empathy for his situation. Now that I've been studying finance at the Naval Postgraduate School, I
have a new perspective on his circumstances: what a waste of taxpayer dollars! It was with this thought in mind that inspired me to write this report. Since that disaster, the U.S. Navy has successfully responded to the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2011earthquake in Tohoku, Japan, but there was very little thought about the financial implications of each operation. Given the high visibility of these types of missions, "send everything and we'll figure out how to pay for it later" is a forgivable strategy. While the Navy has done much to improve its ability to respond to disasters, it has done very little to consider costs in its mission. Instead, the Navy has sent practically every available asset at its disposal. This project will provide information to Navy leadership about what assets should be sent in response to these types of crises in order to provide the most capability and minimize costs at the same time.
This project will analyze the costs associated with those three major operations in order to provide senior leaders with information of what the best options are in future disasters. The project specifically attempts to determine a "capability score" for every platform the U.S. Navy and the Military Sealift Command sent during each of those crises. The report will then derive data from the Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs website to determine the actual costs of sending each ship to respond to the three disasters and compare those costs to the capability score.
Graphical representation of the comparison can lead to further analysis and show which ships are the most cost effective for a given level of HA/DR response capability.
The goal of this project is to offer Navy leadership an analytical framework and set of policy recommendations that show which ships are likely to provide the most capability during a HA/DR operation at the lowest possible cost.
B. SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY
Using the Visibility After assigning a value to the categories, a "total capability score" for each ship type was determined. I then compared the score to the daily operating cost of that ship to yield a dollar value for every point of capability the ship provides. The results of that dollar value demonstrate which ships the Navy should send in the wake of a crisis in order to maximize capability and minimize costs.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. THE RISE OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE DISASTER RELIEF MISSION
The U.S. Navy has dramatically increased its focus. on the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief over the last few decades. From 1970 to 2000, the Navy diverted 366 times for HA/DR operations (Thomas, 2003) . These operations, however, were typically limited actions involving one or two ships, not the substantial movement of material and ships the world has come to expect (Sea Power for a New Era, 2009). The response to Indonesian Tsunami that occurred on December 26, 2004, was enormous. (Elleman, 2007) . Within just ten days of the disaster, the U.S. Navy had 25 ships operating on-scene along with 58 helicopters and had already delivered over 610,000
pounds of food, water, and medical supplies (Elleman, 2007) . The U.S. Navy was able to make a direct impact in helping the people of Sumatra, but this operation also had the indirect impact of enhancing diplomatic relations between the United States and Indonesia, which had an Islamic majority. States has] seen significantly positive impacts in Indonesia, Pakistan and Horn of Africa as a direct result of our and other nations' humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Elleman, 2007, p. 37) . Services' core competencies (Allen et al., 2007) . CS21 further highlighted the need for the naval services to practice a blend of "hard" and "soft" power. The hard power of the Sea Services was the capability to project power ashore and to control the sea, while the soft power was proactively engaging with international partners and potential partners to gain influence with a nation's leadership as well as positively shaping public perceptions of the United States (Allen, Conway, & Roughhead, 2007) . This clear shift in strategy drew praise from numerous foreign policy experts. Gordon Lubold contended that Navy goodwill missions could become the Navy's essential tool in combating terrorism (Lubold, 2007) . The Washington Post openly praised the new strategy upon its release (Tyson, 2007) . Robert Kaplan of The Atlantic wrote an article entitled "America's Elegant Decline," in which he argued that only through an active and globally present Navy could the United States secure its great power status. (Kaplan, 2007) . He further stated that the concept of "hulls in the water" would be far more important in the 21st century than "boots on the ground" (Kaplan, 2007) . Kaplan firmly believed in the CS21 plan and considered the HA/DR mission as one of the key areas of engagement performed by the United States Navy.
In the years since CS21, the Department of Defense has incorporated HA/DR into its strategic documents. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2010 performed by the Department of Defense discussed humanitarian assistance and disaster relief multiple times: four times in discussing building international relationships, once in regards to U.S. interagency cooperation, and once when discussing potential impacts of climate change (Defense, 2010) . By 2011, HA/DR even became a core capability of the entire U.S. military as it was included in the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS had an entire section dedicated to the mission entitled "Theater Security Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance."
Additionally, the U.S. Navy has incorporated the HA/DR mission into its overall recruiting campaign. Since 2010, the U.S. Navy has declared itself "A Global Force for
Good," in a multitude of commercials and on its recruiting website (Navy, 2014) . One commercial showed scenes of ships, aircraft and Sailors in a flooded area conducting search and rescue. Another showed Aircrewmen handing out supplies to children overlooking a devastated area. On the recruiting website, the Navy further explains what constitutes a "Global Force for Good" by saying that, "[the Navy is] a force that readily answers the need for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief anywhere, anytime -to help American citizens and citizens of the world" (Navy, 2014) .
The Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster relief mission has without a doubt become a significant function of the United States Navy. As such, in an era of limited budgets, this mission should be further researched as to how the Navy can improve its capabilities regarding this new mission area while also considering costs at the same time.
B. HELICOPTERS: THE ESSENTIAL ASSET
When the Tsunami hit Sumatra in 2005, over 100 miles of coastline was devastated (Elleman, 2007) . The coastal road was also useless, cutting off supplies by land to all the villages along the coast (Elleman, 2007) . The only method in which the distraught people could quickly receive essential supplies was through the helicopter (Elleman, 2007) . Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander of PACOM, stated that "helicopter vertical lift was vital to the success of the U.S. Navy's humanitarian mission in Indonesia" (Elleman, 2007, p. 48) . Further, then Secretary of State and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell declared on January 5th that in Indonesia, "helicopters are invaluable, especially helicopters coming in from the sea, where they can be refueled and resupplied out on our carriers, and are not taking up space at airfields or putting a logistics base at airfields" (Gray, 2005) . The Provincial Governor of Indonesia also considerably praised the helicopters, proclaiming that they "appeared like angels out of the sky" (U.S. Efforts Aid in Tsunami Relief, 2005).
Navy helicopters have the ability to fly over any terrain up 13,000 feet and provide assistance practically anywhere (NATOPS, 2007) . Furthermore, if the terrain is too rough to land, the helicopter still has the ability to provide assistance by hovering low over the ground and dropping off needed supplies from the cargo hold. These assets also have a very low footprint where they can deliver the needed supplies and leave without the worry of offending the local population by staying. This became an issue in Sumatra in 2005 when the U.S.S. BONHOMME RICHARD wished to provide relief through its amphibious assault ships (Elleman, 2007) . Bruce Elleman, in his thorough account of the Indonesian relief, describes the scene as such:
Positioned off the city of Meulaboh, where only several thousand residents had survived out of an original population of sixty thousand, this ship had landing craft ready to put about a thousand Marines ashore. This movement was delayed, however, because it might appear to be an invasion. Aceh Province had been under the control of the Indonesian military, and it was thought that televised images of U.S. landing craft heading for the Acehnese coast "could touch a raw nerve with the proud and suspicious Indonesian military." Finally, on 10 January 2005, a U.S. Navy LCAC-air-cushion landing craft-went ashore with thirty pallets of food and water. Only a few dozen personnel on Bonhomme Richard were allowed to go ashore each day. Also, instead of driving vehicles themselves to deliver aid-and risking traffic accidents that might spark anti-American anger, as had happened in places like South Korea-the Marines left final distribution of the supplies mainly to the Indonesian military. (Elleman, 2007, p. 80) Aircrewmen using a helicopter can easily absolve them of political and cultural sensitivities by providing the necessary supplies and flying back to their home ship.
Helicopters were truly essential to delivering supplies in Indonesia, as they were the only asset capable of doing so.
The situation in Indonesia with the devastated infrastructure is not unique for a HA/DR mission. Indeed, it is one element that is common in all of the HA/DR missions the Navy has performed since the Tsunami relief in Indonesia. Since then, the U.S. Navy has performed a HA/DR mission in eleven more devastated areas.
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina ripped through the Gulf Coast of the United States.
Sustained winds of over 140 mph wrought havoc on the coastline and its catastrophic aftermath included flooding and devastated infrastructure (Hurricane Katrina, 2005) .
Even in the most industrialized nation in the world, the helicopter was crucial in providing need assets to stranded survivors.
Later that year, an earthquake rocked Pakistan with a massive 7.6 magnitude, leaving hundreds of thousands dead and millions without homes (Thompson, 2005) . The Navy, in an effort to provide the most support possible, sent helicopters from Bahrain to provide support as it was the most important asset needed (Thompson, 2005) . Lieutenant
Commander Todd Vandegrift, Officer-in-Charge of HSC-26, said that his squadron would provide "flight relief, support, water, food, and shelter to distant portions of Pakistan [in order to go to the] parts most affected by the earthquake" (Thompson, 2005) .
He further went on to say that "this allows the United States and the U.S. Navy to support an important ally and lend support to those in need" (Thompson, 2005) .
In February of 2006, a mudslide devastated three villages in the Philippines. The U.S. Navy was quick to respond and within days, the U.S.S Essex the U.S.S Harpers Ferry, and the U.S.S Curtis Wilbur were on scene to provide support (Truax, 2006) . That support was able to be provided because there were numerous. Helicopters stationed on board those ships that could deliver the needed assistance. They helicopters in that situation were able to provide essential relief supplies, perform a reconnaissance of the area, and drop off personnel able to help dig (Truax, 2006) .
Hurricane Felix swept through much of Nicaragua in late 2007. Luckily, two U.S.
Navy ships were nearby and could provide support because they had helicopters stationed onboard. The helicopters played a "major" role in the first week of the disaster mission, airlifting more than 125,000 pounds of relief supplies and medically evacuating 34 people during the initial frantic days after the storm (Wimbish, 2007) . The relief mission commander stated that it was "It was our privilege to provide help to the Nicaraguan people in the aftermath of Hurricane Felix" (Wimbish, 2007) . He further went on to say that it was a "demonstration of the close linkages among the people of the Americas coming to aid a partner nation," highlighting the strategic value a well-performed HA/DR mission can provide to the United States (Wimbish, 2007) .
In another disaster relief mission, the U.S.S KEARSARGE arrived off the coast of Bangladesh to provide assistance in the wake of a Tropical Storm (Hossain, 2007) . The
United States was not well-loved by this country at the time, and demonstrators even chanted in their capital "Go back! We don't want their warships!" (Hossain, 2007) . The ship had twenty helicopters aboard and it was able to provide much-needed assistance solely because of these assets. Admiral Timothy Keating said that "we are here to help people in their time of need" (Hossain, 2007) . This action helped improve relations with Bangladesh overall and demonstrated once again the value of the helicopter in a time of disaster.
The Philippines again faced natural disasters in 2008 and in 2009 when Tropical
Storms hit the island nation. Within days of each disaster, a Carrier battle group had arrived on scene and provide much needed supplies (Fuentes, 2008) According to the U.S. Embassy, the carrier group "[supported] immediate rescue, recovery and disasterrelief efforts being carried out by Philippine authorities" (Fuentes, 2008) . They were able to do this because they had helicopters, as they could not provide support any other way.
In every instance that the U.S. Navy provided relief in HA/DR missions, the helicopter was the essential asset. When determining how much capability a ship has in providing support for a disaster, one mU.S.t first look at how many helicopters the ship can bring, if any at all. While some ships can provide different types of support, this premier asset should be regarded as the highest priority.
III. DATA/METHODOLOGY
Data collection proved to be the most important and difficult part of this project.
Attempting to locate the actual operating costs of the multitude of ships sent in relief proved to be very difficult. However, the articles by Greenfield and Ingram (2011) 
A. AVERAGE DAILY COST
The EM-DAT database contains specific data as to which ships the Navy sent in response to each crisis (EM-DAT, 2014). After compiling that list, one can go back to the VAMOSC database to request a report for those ships during the year that they responded to the disasters. Upon receiving the reports, I Used the ship inflation index in order to convert that dollar amount into a comparable number using 2015 dollars as a standard.
The three tables, Tables 1, 2, The Navy sent a lot of different types of ships to respond to each disaster. Table 4 summarizes the results by describing the average daily cost by ship type across the disasters. These costs play a significant role in the financial analysis generated in this report. Greenfield and Ingram (2011) analyzed capabilities of both U.S.N and MSC vessels by platform. The authors broke down the capability by "little to none," "some,"
and "very capable" and depicted their findings using a visual symbol method. The findings of Greenfield and Ingram are given in Appendix A, B, and C. Based on their research, Table 5 assigns a point system to each of the mission areas they identified and includes a new category for helicopters stationed aboard. Table 5 . Capability Score by Platform
The report above is a conglomeration of information gathered from each shipboard operational manual, located on the Navy Sea Systems Command website (Navy Sea Systems Command Manuals, 2014) . As discussed in the literature review, the helicopter and the vertical lift capability it provides is an essential asset, the U.S. the assignment of a twenty point value for every helicopter stationed aboard each platform. I arrived at the number by averaging the approximate time the supplies could have been delivered had helicopters not been utilized in the three disasters. Using that methodology, the grade of 20 points is generous. Conservative scoring as it does not take into account political sensitivities or even whether or not the supplies could even be delivered by another method.
C. CAPABILITY SCORE VERSUS DAILY COST
The motivation for this report is to offer policy recommendations and a financial analysis of HA/DR operational costs and to provide an understanding of which platforms provide the most "bang for the buck." Table 6 describes cost per aggregated capability, which is calculated by comparing capability to the daily cost. The results are arranged in the ascending order of the total capability per U.S. dollar spent.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
A. CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
Were the U.S. Navy not concerned at all with costs and just wanted to provide as much capability as possible, Table 7 depicts the most capable ships: Table 7 . Total Capability for each Ship Figure 1 illustrates the capability of each of the platforms: 
B. CAVEATS
The methodology used in this study is rudimentary and does not take into account some unusual circumstances which may be considered in future disasters. A large earthquake may entirely change the underwater topography of the area. 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this report is to offer Navy leadership a tool which they could use to determine which ships to send in the wake of a natural disaster. As the HA/DR has become a core competency during a time of limited budgets, it is important to consider cost effective methods of performing this mission. In the past, the U.S. Navy has sometimes sent many types of ships without due regard to their HA/DR capability. This is understandable, as most ships are designed to perform a variety of missions. This project studied what capabilities would contribute most to the HA/DR mission and determined that the helicopter is the most important asset many Navy ships have at their disposal during a disaster. After assigning a score to the various HA/DR capabilities with special consideration of the significance of the helicopter, one could determine a total capability score for each type of ship in the Navy. This report then studied the actual operating costs of every ship involved in three major disasters and determined which ships were the most cost effective.
The results clearly showed that the LHD, LHA, and the LPD were by far the most cost effective ships to send in the wake of a disaster. The report also showed that ship types such as the HSV, T-AO, T-AK, and a DDG without a helicopter aboard provided little HA/DR capability and were not cost effective. In future disasters, Navy leaders may look at Figures 8 and 9 to help them determine which ships to send to the area.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
While realizing that it is sometimes difficult to break up the battle order of a Carrier Strike Group, Navy Leadership should take the HA/DR capability into account before diverting assets into a disaster area.
HA/DR stakeholders within the U.S. Navy should study the previous missions to ascertain which ships could have been cut from the response without causing any detriment to the overall response capability. One could use the tables established in this report as a baseline to determine an ideal solution from each of the disasters. This research could further be expanded by adding up the operating costs of the ships to demonstrate how much the U.S. Navy could have saved had it sent a more appropriate response.
Future force planners within the U.S. Navy should take into account the HA/DR mission as it chooses the most suitable platforms for the future. New aircraft such as drones may be valuable assets in the HA/DR mission. Providing a model for how many may be required may assist future planners in their estimates for the number the U.S.
Navy should acquire.
As the U.S. Navy has incorporated HA/DR into its core competencies, further research could be done on the viability of future exercises having the mission as its primary purpose. Examination of the benefits of such an exercise could be worthwhile to explore. Further, one may consider having an expert in HA/DR on each of the Combatant
